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Abstract
Game theoretic predictions about equilibrium behavior depend
upon assumptions of inflexibility of belief, of accord between
belief and choice, and of choice across situations that share a
game-theoretic structure. However, researchers rarely possess any
knowledge of the actual beliefs of subjects, and rarely compare
how a subject behaves in settings that share game-theoretic
structure but that differ in other respects. Our within-subject
experiments utilize a belief elicitation mechanism, roughly
similar to a prediction market, in a laboratory setting to identify
subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ choices and beliefs. These
experiments additionally allow us to compare choices in different
settings that have similar game-theoretic structure. We find first,
as have others,that subjects’ choices in the Trust and related
games are significantly different from the strategies that derive
from subgame perfect Nash equilibrium principles. We show that,
for individual subjects, there is considerable flexibility of choice
and belief across similar tasks and that the relationship between
belief and choice is similarly flexible. To improve our ability to
predict human behavior, we must take account of the flexible
nature of human belief and choice.

The Assumption that Actions Follow Beliefs
Game theoretic models are utilized across a variety of
domains to address important problems such as allocation
of security forces (Pita et al. 2011), allocation of health
care services (Roth 1990), and the design of institutions
(Kagel and Roth 1997). Even a survey of surveys would be
beyond the scope of this paper. (For a start, see Fudenberg
and Tirole 1991, Ordeshook 1986, Nisan et. al. 2007,
Tirole 1988.) Despite the prominent, and often quite
successful, applications of game theory in these settings,
we also observe many situations in which behavior does
not accord with the predictions derived from game theory
(for a survey see Camerer 2003).
To address the discrepancy between predicted and actual
behavior, scholars have taken various approaches. Three
Copyright © 2011, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.

Nicholas Weller
University of Southern California
Department of Political Science
Los Angeles, CA
nweller@usc.edu

of the most common approaches are to propose that
discrepancies arise from (1) cognitive biases and
dysfunctions in the decision-making of players (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979; Rabin and Thaler 2001; Ainslie 2001,
Elster 1999); (2) mismatches between a game’s payoffs
and an individual’s utility (Hoffman et. al. 1994, Rabin
1993); and (3) the effects of uncertainty, bounded search
ability, or limits in thinking about others’ likely behavior
(Simon 1957, Gigerenzer and Selten 2002, Stahl and
Wilson 1994; Crawford and Costa-Gomes 2006).
Although experimental subjects regularly make choices
that do not comport with Nash equilibrium strategies (or
even von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximization),
this does not imply that human reasoning is flawed.
Rather, human intelligence is flexible, creating enormous
diversity of beliefs and choices, the challenge is that the
models to which we put them to the test are not flexible.
Humans are able to solve many tasks that are quite difficult
(Gigerenzer 2000, 2008: Turner 2009). To build a better
theory of human behavior, we must start with an
appreciation for how we actually reason. As cognitive
science has shown, intuitive notions of how the mind
works (vision, language, memory, etc.) may be very useful
for the human being to hold as scaffolding for
consciousness, but they are comprehensively wrong and
simplistic. Intuitive notions of how we reason are not a
basis for science. How we reason must be discovered, not
assumed, and certainly not borrowed from intuition
As is well known in game theory, Nash equilibrium
requires players to have correct and consistent beliefs
(Rasmusen 2006). To have “correct beliefs” is to regard
other players as “Nash players” and to predict that they
follow Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies. It is also required
that players have “common knowledge” that they are all
Nash players, that is, that they know that other players
know that they themselves are following Nash equilibrium
strategies, and so on, ad infinitum. Lupia et. al. (2010)
point out that “Common Nash refinements have similar
attributes. Although these refinements differ in what they
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allow players to know and believe, they continue to require
that actors share identical conjectures of other players’
strategies” ( p. 106)
If players do not believe that other players will play
consistent with Nash equilibria, then it is no longer true,
relative to their beliefs, that their own best response is to
follow a Nash equilibrium strategy. Recent experimental
work has shown that subjects’ beliefs frequently do not
match our theoretical assumptions and that their behavior
can be reasonable, given their beliefs (McKenzie and
Mikkelsen 2007). Some prior work on subjects’ beliefs in
experimental games also suggests that subjects often have
non-equilibrium beliefs (Kuhlman and Wimberely 1976;
Croson 2007). In what follows, using a within-subjects
design, we investigate choices in a large battery of games,
and we elicit subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ choices
and beliefs in these games, using an analog of prediction
markets.

Experimental Design
We report on a portion of our battery of tasks here related
to the well-known Trust game (as developed by Berg et al.
1995). In our experiments, subjects know that their choices
are always private and anonymous, even to the
experimenters at the time of the experiment. Subjects
receive no feedback, during the course of the experiment,
about the consequences of their choices, except for quizzes
related to our narratives/manipulations (subjects may, for
some of our tasks, be able to infer the consequences of
their choices). For each task, subjects are randomly
matched to another subject. Thus, to the extent possible,
given they were in narratives that describe games, every
task is a single shot, separate from the prior and future
choices. We also ensure that no subject knows anyone else
in either of the two rooms of the experiment.
The Trust game involves two players. Each player
begins with a $5 endowment. The first player chooses how
many dollars, if any, to pass to an anonymous second
player. In our experimental protocols, we use no labels
other than “the other person(s).” To avoid suggesting an
investment or reciprocity frame we label actions as
“transfer.” The first player keeps any money he does not
pass. The money that is passed is tripled in value and the
second player receives the tripled amount. The second
player at that point retains the original $5 plus three times
the amount the first player passed, and decides how much,
if any, of that total amount to return to the first player. The
second player at the moment of choice in the Trust game is
in a role that is equivalent to the role of Dictator in the
Dictator game. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) is that Player 1 will send $0 and Player 2 will send
$0. This is also a dominant strategy equilibrium.
These equilibrium strategies derive from assumed

beliefs: the assumption is that all players maximize
economic payoff and believe that all other players do the
same. In the Trust game, a Player 1 with these beliefs
concludes that Player 2 will return nothing and so, as a
maximizer, Player 1 sends nothing.
The beliefs that
players hold about other players lead to the belief at every
level of recursion that all players will send $0, will guess
that others will send $0, will guess that others will predict
that everyone will send $0, and so on ad infinitum.
But what happens if a subject with these Nash beliefs
finds himself off the equilibrium path? In the Trust game,
only Player 2 could make a choice after finding himself or
herself presented with an off-the-equilibrium-path choice.
If Player 2 is gifted with anything more than his or her $5
endowment, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
strategy is still to send $0 back.
We add elements to the basic Trust game to tap into
subjects’ beliefs. Our belief elicitation mechanism borrows
from the idea of a prediction market (Wolfers and
Zitzewitz 2004). For the Trust game, we ask Player 1 to
make two additional decisions and Player 2 to make one
additional decision. We do not ask subjects to report their
expectations or beliefs, because asking for a report might
have normative implications. Rather, we ask them to
“guess” other subjects’ choices, or to guess other subjects’
“predictions.” In general, we try to provide little or no
framing of the experimental tasks offered to our subjects.
After Player 1 makes his choice about how much to pass,
we ask him to guess how much Player 2 will return.
Before Player 2 learns Player 1’s choice, we ask Player 2
to guess how much money Player 1 passed. We also ask
Player 2 to guess how much Player 1 predicted she would
transfer. After Player 2 learns Player 1’s choice, we ask
Player 2 to guess how much Player 1 predicted she would
return. All players know that all players earn $3 for each
correct guess and earn nothing for a guess that is wrong.
The questions we ask vary slightly for each task, but as
an example, here is the exact question we ask Player 2:
“How much money do you guess the other person
transferred to you? If you guess correctly, you will earn $3.
If not, you will neither earn nor lose money.” We add
similar incentivized prediction tasks to various
experimental tasks. Players do not learn whether their
predictions were right or wrong and subjects never have
any information about other subjects’ guesses.
Players in the Trust game know that they are randomly
paired with another subject in a different room. Later in the
experiment, all subjects also make choices as Player 2,
randomly assigned to the player in the other room who was
Player 1. Accordingly, all subjects first make choices as
Player 1 and then, roughly 90 minutes later, make choices
as Player 2 (randomly assigned to a different Player 1).
They thus play Trust twice, but in different roles. Player 1
never learns the consequences of any of his or her choices
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in the Trust game. Player 2 can of course infer the
consequences of his or her own choices.
Subjects also make decisions in a variety of other games,
including a Dictator game and what we call the Donation
game. In both these games, each subject is randomly paired
with another subject in another room. In the Dictator
game, The Dictator (Player 1) and the Receiver (Player 2)
have endowments identical to those the subject in the role
of Dictator faced when he or she was in the role of Player 2
faced in Trust. Accordingly, the Dictator game was
identical right down to the specific endowments to the
second half of the Trust game. In effect, each subject
replayed the second half of the Trust game, but now
without the reciprocity frame. The SPNE is for the Dictator
to send $0 to the Receiver. The Donation game is
identical, except that each player begins with a $5
endowment and the amount Player 1 chooses to send is
quadrupled before it is given to Player 2 (making it roughly
similar to the choice faced by Player 1 in the Trust game).
The SPNE is again for the Donor to send $0.
Our subjects also play, among other things, a unanimous
Public Goods game with nine other players, randomly
assigned. Each of the ten players in the group is endowed
with $5. In these games, players must decide whether to
keep their $5 or contribute all $5 to a “pot.” In this task, if
all players contribute their $5 endowment to the “pot,” then
the money is tripled, and the money is distributed equally
to all players, in which case each player gets $15. There
are two pure strategy Nash equilibria to this game. In one,
no one contributes, and each subject keeps the $5
endowment. In the second, everyone contributes, and
everybody earns $15. Subjects’ behavior in this step-level
unanimity Public-goods game is conditioned on their
beliefs about which equilibrium will arise. If a player
believes all other nine players are going to contribute, then
he or she should contribute; if not, then not.
At the end of the experiment, we present the subjects
with the few tasks that would allow them to learn
something about the choices made by subjects in the other
room. So, for example, they are presented the tasks for
Player 2’s choice in the Trust game as one of their final
tasks. In this last stage, we have no choice but to provide
subjects with feedback in the form of information about
what other subjects have done. For example, Player 2 in
Trust must know what Player 1 chose to send. Only in this
last stage, then, is there any chance for learning or
development of individual or group reputations. The order
of experimental tasks is identical for all subjects in the
experiment except during the public goods game, where by
design we systematically manipulate the order of two
tasks: (1) making choices and (2) guessing the choices
made by others.
The subjects in our experiment completed the tasks
using pen and paper in a controlled classroom

environment. Subjects were recruited using flyers and
email messages distributed across a large public California
university and were not compelled to participate in the
experiment, although they were given $5 in cash when they
showed up. A total of 180 subjects participated in this
experiment. The experiment lasted approximately two
hours, and subjects received on average about $41 in cash.
The experiment was followed sometime later with a postexperiment questionnaire, for which subjects were also
paid.

Uncovering Subjects’ Beliefs
In many of our tasks, we ask subjects to make guesses
about other players’ actions and predictions. We pay the
subjects $3 for correct guesses. All subjects in our
experiments know this. Do subjects believe what game
theory assumes they believe? The answer is, mostly, no.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) in the
Trust Game is that neither Player 1 nor Player 2 will send
any money to the other. All should believe that all others
will predict that no one will send money, and all such
beliefs should be recursive, so that Player A believes
Player B believes Player A believes Player B will send no
money, and so on for any number of steps and for any
subject in any role.
But we see quite the contrary in our experiments: Figure
1 shows that only 68 of 180 subjects as Player 2 believe
that Player 1 will send nothing. In other words, 62% of
subjects have “incorrect” beliefs, this is beliefs contrary to
those that support SPNE strategies.
Figure 2 shows guesses made by Player 1 of the amount
Player 2 will return. We include even the Player 1s who
sent nothing. (Since Player 2 begins with a $5 endowment,
Player 2 can transfer money even if Player 1 sent nothing.)
Ninety-two of the 180 subjects guess that Player 2 will
return $0, but 88, or 49%, believe that Player 2 will return
some money. This means that 49% of these subjects have
“incorrect” beliefs. Their beliefs diverge broadly from
SPNE, across a large span of possible returns.
We also investigate beliefs in other games. We have 160
of our 180 subjects participate in a unanimous Public
Goods game (in one session, one room received flawed
instructions for this task and thus the behavior for all 20
subjects is dropped from our analysis of this task). In this
task, subjects have two choices: to contribute their $5 or
not. There are two pure strategy equilibria—one in which
no one contributes and one in which all subjects contribute.
Therefore, we are particularly interested in whether beliefs
are consistent with one or the other of those equilibria.
Subjects play the Public Goods game with nine other
subjects, and we ask subjects to predict how many of the
other nine subjects will contribute to the Public Good. We
find that 47 of the 160 subjects (29.4%) guess that zero

Figure 1: Player 2 guesses of amount Player 1 sent

other subjects will contribute, and 42 subjects (26.2%)
guess that all nine of the other subjects will contribute. The
rest of the subjects, however, hold beliefs at variance to
pure strategy NE: their guesses span the range of
participation levels and are neither simple nor uniform.
One important telltale in this game comes when we
balance the order of the tasks. In some cases, we ask the
subjects first to choose whether to contribute and second to
guess the other subjects’ choices. In other cases, we
present the tasks in the reverse order. For the theory of
games, the order of these two tasks cannot affect subjects’
strategies or choices. But our experiments show that
subjects who choose first guess on average that 3.3 other
players will contribute, while subjects who guess first
guess on average that 4.6 other players will contribute
(p=0.03 in a Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions
test), with 80 subjects in each group. Further, in an equality
of proportions tests 25% of subject choose to contribute
when making their choice before their prediction, whereas
43% choose to put their money in the pot when prompted
about their beliefs before they made their choice (p<.03).
This result suggests that changing the order of belief
elicitation and choice significantly affects subjects’ beliefs.
This simple change in task order does not accord with
Nash equilibrium expectations. Are the subjects who guess
after they choose simply winging it first and rationalizing
later, or are the others simply winging their guesses first
and then choosing according to something else later?
While we don’t know where beliefs come from, we can
compare subjects’ beliefs about others in one part of the
Trust game with their choices in that same part of the Trust
game. For example, we can examine the difference
between what a subject choose to do as Player 1 in the
Trust game, and what they believe as Player 2 that Player 1
will do. The modal category is subjects believe that other
subjects will play like them: 109 of the 180 subjects guess
that the choice of the Player 1 with whom they are

Figure 2: Many Player 1s expect money to be returned

randomly matched will be the same as their own choice
when they were Player 1. For these subjects, theory of
mind might equal theory of self, or this may simply
represent the “false consensus” effect in which people
think others are more like them than they actually are
(Ross et al. 1977), or it might be akin to the curse of
knowledge, but we can’t really tell. Perhaps most
surprising, there is a large variance, with 71 subjects (39%)
making guesses that differ from their own choices.

Consistently Inconsistent
The standard approaches to explaining departures from
NE strategies (other-regarding preferences, cognitive
constraints, or decision-making biases) implicitly assume
that players deviate from game-theoretic expectations in
consistent ways. For example, if players prefer to reduce
inequality, that preference should be stable across all
manner of economic games. Or, if players cannot perform
backward deletion of dominated sub-games, as game
theory requires, then this handicap should operate in all
game environments of equal difficulty. To date, there has
been little focus on identifying the extent to which players
have consistent beliefs or behavior across games.
Cognitive science gives us considerable reason to doubt
that players will behave identically across different
environments, because changes in environment lead to
changes in mental activation, which affects beliefs and
behavior. As Sherrington famously wrote, the state of the
brain is always shifting, “a dissolving pattern, always a
meaningful pattern, though never an abiding one”
(Sherrington [1941], 1964). If the particular tasks, and
order of those tasks, induce different mental activations,
then belief and behavior should vary accordingly. Our
experiment is designed to shed light on whether subjects
have consistent beliefs and make consistent choices.
Our first cut at this question is simply to examine the
number of subjects who have beliefs consistent with NE

Player 1

across a variety of tasks. In the Trust game, subjects make
predictions as Player 1 about the behavior of Player 2 and
as Player 2 about the behavior of Player 1. We already
demonstrated that in either single task, a great many
subjects do not have SPNE beliefs. In Table 1, we show
the number of subjects with Nash beliefs and non-Nash
beliefs as both Player 1 and Player 2 in the Trust game. If
Player 1 has Nash beliefs, it means that this subject
guessed that Player 2 would return nothing. If Player 2 has
Nash beliefs, it means that the subject guessed that Player
1 would send nothing. Overall, out of 180 subjects in our
analysis, only 63 subjects made guesses as both Player 1
and 2 that were consistent with Nash beliefs. In other
words, only 35% of our subjects have consistently “Nash
beliefs” even inside this one game.
Player 2

Player 2

Nash beliefs

Non-Nash
beliefs

Nash beliefs

63

29

Non-Nash
beliefs

5

83

Table 1: Subjects’ beliefs in Trust game (N=180)

There were 83 subjects who lacked Nash beliefs in both
part of the Trust game, 29 subjects who possessed “Nash
beliefs” as Player 1 but not as Player 2, and only 5 subjects
who possessed “Nash beliefs” as Player 2 but not as Player
1. Our experiment does not allow us to identify why
players’ beliefs diverge from the NE beliefs, but it is clear
that most subjects deviate from “Nash beliefs” during at
least one of the experimental tasks.
We can also examine the actions/choices of individual
subjects across a number of similar tasks to see if
individual subjects behave consistently. In particular, we
look at subject behavior across a set of tasks, all of which
involve choosing how much money to transfer to another
person, and in which the outcome of that decision is not
contingent on the other person. In the Trust game, subjects
play the role of Player 1 and 2 during the course of the
experiment. There were 60 subjects who were “fully Nash
actors” throughout the game; that is, they chose SPNE
strategies (i.e., $0) as both Player 1 and Player 2.
Another way to investigate consistency of behavior is to
examine the choices of subjects who as Player 2 in Trust
received money from Player 1. Of the 100 subjects who
received money as Player 2 in Trust, only 62 returned any
of the money to Player 1. Additionally, of those 62, only
40 sent money in the Dictator game. This shows that many
subjects do not behave consistently in these two tasks, in
which their actions could reduce inequality. Further, of the

40 who sent money in Dictator, only 29 also send money in
the Donation game. This means that of the 100 subjects
who received money as Player 2 in Trust, only 29 sent
money to the other player in all three related tasks. This
shows that subjects do not behave consistently even in
their violations of SPNE.
We have seen, and the literature broadly documents, that
subjects deviate remarkably from Nash equilibrium
strategies. We have reported how subjects’ beliefs deviate
from those necessary to support equilibrium strategies.
We have also shown that these deviations are not
consistent. Accordingly, it is doubtful that proposals to
explain deviation from Nash strategies and beliefs by
attributing to subjects a particular consistent mental or
behavioral signature will succeed.

Does behavior accord with beliefs?
Now, we ask whether actions are minimally rational,
that is, do subjects’ actions accord with their beliefs? To
begin, we investigate whether action and belief accord in
the Trust game. Figure 3 shows the decisions of subjects
as Player 1 about the amount of money to send to Player 2
in the Trust game. Over one-half of subjects (100 out of
180) pass money, which is inconsistent with a SPNE
strategy, and on average subjects pass $1.43. Of the 100
subjects who receive money as Player 2, 62 of them return
some money to Player 1. On net, Player 1 loses money.
This result—that players choose to pass some money in the
Trust game—has been well-documented (Berg et al. 1995).
Figure 4 displays the difference between the amount
Player 1 sends to Player 2 and the amount Player 1 guesses
Player 2 will return. Recall that any money sent by Player
1 is tripled before it is sent to Player 2, (e.g., if Player 1
sends all $5, then Player 2 has $20, and if Player 2 splits
that money, then Player 1 and Player 2 end with $10 each,
and we would say that each has “earned” $5 through their
actions). Figure 4 shows that there are only a few players

Figure 3: Distribution of amount Player1s pass in Trust game

Figure 4: Guesses by Player 1 of profit from choice

who guess that they will lose money by sending money to
the other player. Mostly, players expect to benefit from
their decision. The beliefs held by these players imply not
only that they do not expect others to play consistently
with SPNE strategies, but also that they expect, on average,
to profit from their non-SPNE strategy to send money.
There are 100 subjects who as Player 1 in Trust chose to
send a positive amount to Player 2, and 20 of those players
guess they will not receive anything in return. These 20
players guess that Player 2 will follow a SPNE strategy.
These 20 subjects cannot simultaneously be maximizing
their payoffs and hold the belief that Player 2 will follow a
SPNE strategy of returning $0 so it is hard to see how their
choices accord with their own beliefs. We must either
conclude that they are not payoff maximizers or relax the
assumption that subjects act according to beliefs. One way
to relax that assumption is to give up the assumption that
believing, preferring, deciding, and acting are simultaneous
and coordinated mental events. Perhaps subjects act
without fully activating their decisions, or believe without
activating the consequences of those beliefs for action, or
act without activating beliefs, and so on.
Recall that earlier we identified 60 subjects who were
“fully Nash actors” in the Trust game, that is, the subjects
whose actions as both Player 1 and 2 were consistent with
SPNE strategy. We turn now to these 60 subjects and
examine whether their beliefs are “fully Nash” in the Trust
game. The answer is no. First, let us consider these 60
subjects in the role of Player 1 in Trust. Of these 60
subjects, 56 guessed as Player 1 that Player 2 would return
nothing, which is consistent with SPNE. They also
guessed Player 2’s prediction of the amount they will pass.
Only 40 of the 60 “fully Nash” Trust players (66%)
guessed that Player 2 predicted that they would transfer $0.
The other 20 of the 60 “fully Nash” Trust players (1/3rd)
lacked that SPNE belief. They also guessed Player 2’s

prediction of Player 1’s guess of what Player 2 will return.
Of the 60 subjects, 49 (81%) had beliefs consistent with
SPNE. These results show that even the 60 “fully Nash”
Trust subjects hold beliefs whose degree of consistency
with SPNE principles varies question by question even
when we look at only those questions asked of them when
they are in the role of Player 1. Beliefs show flexibility.
We next turn to the beliefs of those 60 “fully Nash”
Trust subjects when they are in the role of Player 2 in
Trust. Of the 60, 44 guess that Player 1 will transfer
nothing; that is, 16 of 60 (27%) lack SPNE beliefs. Of the
60, 35 guess that Player 1 predicts that they will return
nothing; that is, for this question, 42% of these 60 “fully
Nash” Trust subjects have beliefs that are inconsistent with
SPNE. Overall, non-SPNE beliefs are quite common even
among the 60 “fully Nash” actors in the Trust Game.
Beliefs show flexibility
Next, we ask whether the 60 “fully-Nash” actors in Trust
are “fully Nash” in the related Donation and Dictator
games. Here we find that 57 of the 60 subjects pass $0 in
the Dictator game and 50 of the 60 pass $0 in the Donation
game. If we focus on those 57 subjects who are “fully Nash
actors” as both Player 1 and Player 2 in Trust and also as
Dictator in the Dictator game, we find that 48 of the 57
(84%) pass nothing in the Donation game. Therefore,
across our entire 180 subjects, only 48 (27%) have
consistent Nash behavior in Trust, Donation, and Dictator.
The results from our battery of experimental tasks
demonstrate that subjects regularly deviate from SPNE in
both their beliefs and behavior, that the deviations are
themselves inconsistent, and that there is variation in the
degree to which behavior accords with belief.

Discussion
Our results show, as is usually shown, that subjects deviate
from game-theoretic predictions. Our findings also show
that these deviations are not consistent; they depend on the
specific setting and task. Our results demonstrate that
beliefs are also inconsistent. These deviations are so
pervasive and so various even within subject that is seems
unwarranted to refer to them as “deviations.” On the
contrary, consistent “Nash behavior and beliefs” appear to
be remarkable deviations from human cognitive patterns
and human behavioral norms. It may be that people can be
trained to comply with these deviations, at least to some
extent, for rare and specially-designed cultural conditions,
such as strategic board games, under the additional
stipulations that the other human beings in the story are
somehow constrained and also trained to be deviant in the
same ways.
Our results are not consistent with a view that decision
and action are coordinated around inflexible beliefs and
preferences. Rather, different tasks and settings appear to

lead to different mental activations in subjects, and
subjects respond flexibly. This flexibility has not been
well-appreciated by existing approaches to modeling
human action in economic settings. Research into decisionmaking should turn now to the goal of discovering what
those cognitive patterns of decision-making actually are.
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